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In November 1889, the Chilean Minister of Colonization Martin Drouilly responded to a request from the German immigrant Federico Hartling, who was seeking to gain *colono*, or colonizer status from the ministry. This temporary, coveted title would entitle him to a parcel of eleven hectares of land in the Araucanía region of Southern Chile, and an additional nine hectares for every male son in his family. In Hartling's case, he had been waiting for his parcel of land since his arrival to Chile in 1885 and was later transferred to the city of Traiguen, where he met his future wife. His request asked for the land neighboring his father in law's home, and argued that as a someone who had once been given *colono* status upon his arrival to Chile in 1885, he had developed the capacity and financial means to make the land agriculturally productive.[1] Furthermore, he had never been given the lands that were promised in his *colono* contract, and these could be a way for the government to fulfill their agreement. The following month Drouilly offered this sharply worded reply,

> In the present case, the solicitant has not even produced for his colony, therefore he never was a *colono*. Now that everything is populated and that the territory has much more value, he comes to ask for (land worth) double what he would have been offered to come to Chile. In the judgment of this office, there is no reason to make exceptions for the solicitant and his request must be denied.[2]

Hartling's case and Drouilly's response reflect the importance of the *colono* status in the recently occupied Araucanía region. As this chapter shows, it became inextricably linked to

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[1] Archivo Nacional Historico (National Historical Archive), Hereby referred to as the ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 436 (Oct. 17, 1889), Carta al Ministerio de *Colonización Martin Drouilly (Letter to the Minister of Colonization Martin Drouilly)*

[2] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Vol. 436 (Oct. 23, 1889) "Respuesta a Federico Hartling" (Response to Federico Harting)

the Chilean state's vision for agricultural development as done primarily by migrants from Europe and North America who had access to the latest knowledge of agricultural technology. These newly recruited *colonos* would be, unlike Hartling, financially productive members of Chilean society. The lands they were given as part of their *colono* contract increased in value as the region developed infrastructure such as roads and railways that would assist both in the growth of industry and in the development of these new *colono* communities. As a result of these priorities, the rejection of cases such as Hartling's was commonplace. Similar cases from other German migrants reveal that the Ministry prioritized the newly parceled lands for recently arrived North American and European immigrants, and settlers who had arrived years prior, such as Hartling and native born Chileans, were reclassified as *nacionales* or nationals, a category that reflected the secondary importance these people had to the Ministry. The arrival of both Chilean and European settlers would form part of a decades long process of encroachment for local indigenous communities, who as a result of resettlement policies found themselves struggling to maintain their ancestral territories.

While the rejection of Harling's request reflected the state's vision for agricultural development in the region as one dependent on new arrivals from Europe, for Hartling and those in similar situations the decision was one that had a significant impact on their livelihood. As a *colono,* not only would he be entitled to land, but also to the monetary protection of the Ministry of Colonization should he encounter crop failure. Though his land title wouldn't guarantee protection from swindlers and the land grabs that were becoming commonplace in the region, having a legal document that proved ownership of territory was becoming increasingly valuable as lawsuits over disputed territories frequently asked for legal proof of ownership. And, as Minister Drouilly indicated, as lands in the

south were mapped, they gained a monetary value that was affected by the potential development of industry in the region. These lands would either be given to *colonos*, or sold in land auctions both in Santiago and in the southern city of Concepcion. After fulfilling their proper obligations with the state, the *colono* could potentially sell his land for a sizable profit. As more lands were parceled and settlers began forming communities that later grew into small towns, land in the region grew in value, making the *colono* designation an increasingly financially valuable status.

Martin Drouilly's reply was directly in line with the goals and aims of the colonization project undertaken by the Chilean state after the Occupation of the Araucanía region in 1883. While Hartling's request might not have seemed unreasonable at first as a longtime resident of the immigrant colonies, territories in the region were being mapped and reserved for new potential European agricultural settlers whom the state believed were familiar with the latest technological methods in growing crops. In turn, the state spent large sums of money transporting European *colonos* to their newly parceled territory, with the expectation that within a few years they would be able to contribute to the local economy by developing their farms using the latest agricultural technologies and methods. Although Hartling was of European descent, he had been living in Chile for a long enough time to make him a less coveted addition to the region. His inability to prove that he was capable of growing crops and making plots of land productive also worked against his cause. Drouilly's rejection of his request, and insistence on classifying settlers much like Harltling as *nacionales* (nationals), the same category reserved for native born Chileans who applied to be *colonos* sent a clear signal regarding the social hierarchies that were created as a result of these designations. These *nacionales* received less financial and legal privileges, and would not be paid to migrate to the region. Furthermore, because property in

the region of Traiguen had increased in value by 1889, Drouilly was saving the scarce amount of land available for European settlers. The financial and legal privileges of European settlers above those of native born Chileans and indigenous peoples in turn created a social hierarchy in the region that led to conflicts in the form of lawsuits, and created conditions for land grabs and exploitations that disproportionately affected indigenous communities and often resulted in displacement.

This chapter clarifies the way the classification strategies exemplified by Drouilly's emphatic rejection of Hartling's request for *colono* status facilitated the process of colonization in the Araucanía region; through a close examination of the archival records of two of the primary state apparatuses that recruited and settled European colonizers in the region: The Ministries of Culto y Colonizacion and Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Colonization and Foreign Relations). Both offices functioned separately, but together formed part of intertwined processes that reflected a single state vision for the development of Araucanía. I argue that the distribution of territory in the region was a process that both revealed the inefficiency of the Chilean government to successfully colonize the region, and resulted in conflicts between communities over the rightful possession of land. As the two ministry sections mediated both recruitment and land distribution, the inefficiencies of each branch cast doubt among bureaucrats and *colonos* regarding their ability to effectively execute the goals of the colonization project. The first section of this chapter considers the background leading to the Wars of Occupation, and seeks to explain why the Chilean state considered the colonization project crucial to the economic and social progress of the nation. The second section examines conflicts that unfolded as local bureaucrats and European *colonos* contended with the lack of infrastructure and territorial issues that arose as the colonization progressed. The final section examines the impact that these processes

had in continuing the dispossession of indigenous populations in the years after the end of the War of Occupation. This chapter sets the stage for a larger discussion of lawsuits between indigenous peoples and *colonos*, which I explore in the following chapter.

An analysis of the policies and recruitment efforts in the two decades following the Occupation of the Araucanía reflected the Chilean states' belief that in order to make the land in the region profitable, it needed to be settled primarily by European colonizers who would bring their superior agricultural knowledge with them. From their offices in Berlin and Paris, the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) recruited European colonizers with promises of fertile soil and economic prosperity. Simultaneously, this propaganda shows how the Chilean state wished to portray itself to the European community, as a country that was rapidly modernizing and could provide significant economic opportunities for agricultural and industrial growth. The need for advances in agricultural technology became more pressing as the Chilean population grew steadily, and as a response to the growing nitrate industry in Northern Chile at the turn of the 20th century. The ministry of Colonization in southern Chile however, was unable to keep up with the growing demands of the European population who migrated to the region, and did not provide an infrastructure that would be able to safeguard *colonos*, both Chilean and European, from potential land grabs and fraud. Indigenous peoples were particularly vulnerable in this system of land distribution, as some groups depended on free movement for cattle raising. The enclosure of lands would significantly after their lifestyle, and those who pursued legal means to recover lost territory were at the mercy of a system they often did not understand. While the Ministry of Colonization sought to address their needs through a Protector de Indigenas (Protector of Indigenous Peoples) this was a position that in many communities was underpaid or unable to protect indigenous peoples from

exploitation. The failures of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization, as a result, were indicative of a state that was highly centralized and was unable to effectively meet the needs of a peripheral population.

1. Precursors to Colonization

The mostly rural population of Chile experienced steady growth after the wars of Independence, though the push for agricultural development was driven by a desire to both industrialize and to meet the needs of a growing urban population. As historian Arnold Bauer notes, by the end of the 19th century the number of people had more than doubled to 2.7 million inhabitants, though Chilean society remained largely stratified between a small, urban population that had a desire for imported luxury goods, and a rural population that made its living through subsistence farming. Within the rural communities of Chile, however, was a rigid social structure that made its living off of crops that had been grown for generations with little room for diversification.[3] As trade routes opened with California and Australia after 1850, there was a need to move away from the pastoral economy of the colonial period, and toward the industrialization of agriculture that would require technological advances and a greater focus on cash crops. As the demand for wheat increased, some areas of the central valley of Chile for example began moving away from cattle ranching and toward wheat production. While wheat had been grown in Chile since the colonial period, after the 1840's the market for the crop grew as other countries that were also undergoing industrial revolutions and experiencing population growth

[3] Arnold Bauer, *Expansion economica en una sociedad tradicional: Chile Central en el siglo XIX.* (Santiago: Ediciones Historia, 1970) 138.(*Economic Expansion in a Traditional Society: Cental Chile in the 19th Century*)

experienced an increased demand for the product.[4] As one of the most fertile regions of Chile, the Araucanía was seen by the Chilean state and potential farmers as an area with untapped economic potential. Although wheat had been grown in the region since the colonial period, a large expanse of the territory remained under the control of indigenous groups, mainly the Mapuche and Pehuenche peoples. These communities had remained in control of the territory south of the Bio Bio River in large part due to a series of negotiations and treaties that has been negotiated throughout much of the colonial period. While occasional skirmishes and insurrections had occurred as a result of the sometimes volatile relationship between Spanish and indigenous forces, as a result of the negotiated treaties the border remained relatively stable until the mid 19th century.

The Araucanía region of Southern Chile had maintained an intermittently fluid border throughout the colonial period, during which Spanish colonists and Mapuche tribes fought and negotiated intermittently for greater control over the territory. While the Bio Bio River had served as a natural border, increased contact with the Spanish altered significantly lowered the Mapuche population and introduced livestock to the region. As historian Patricia Richards notes, while the low population numbers due to disease and warfare inhibited the maintenance of a sedentary lifestyle, the Mapuche were able to create an expansive pastoral economy and remained semi nomadic until the late 19th century. While the Spanish and Mapuche negotiated the frontier lines until independence, throughout the colonial period and the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Araucanía region south of the Bio Bio for the most part existed as a space free from state

[4] ibid., 140.

and colonial control and was governed by independent Mapuche groups.[5] During the mid nineteenth century, the Araucanía region saw an increase in migration of Mapuche peoples from the central valleys of Chile as a result of a push southward from Chilean *colonos,* or poor settlers. While indigenous peoples had owned land in central Chile since the colonial period, their new designation as "citizens" of Chile meant that they were subject to the liberties and laws granted by the state.[6] This designation, however, also granted the state legal power over their territories, which were then sold to *colonos*. The selling of Mapuche territory in the central valley, through the legal justification of citizenship, Wars of Pacification, which began in the 1870's and proposed to expand the territory of the nation significantly.

The growth of the German colony of Valdivia in the southern Araucanía served in many ways as an example of what the Chilean state hoped to achieve in the region. Founded in the 1840's by a small group of German migrants, immigration to Valdivia increased throughout the 1850's, and because the area developed with the strong economic and military support of the Chilean government industries and agricultural development came rapidly. Settlers to the region enjoyed vast parcels of land, and from Valdivia goods were produced and exported to Central Chile and Europe.[7] By the 1860's, Valdivia owned the most industries of any other city in Chile, making it an example to follow for cities in the Araucanía such as Concepcion and later Temuco. The inhabitants of Valdivia also came

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[5] Patricia Richards, *Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013) 35.

[6] Klubock, *La Frontera: Forests and Ecological Conflict in Chile's Frontier Territory,* 9.

[7] George F. Young, "Bernardo Philippi, Initiator of German Colonization in Chile" *The Hispanic American Historical Review* Vol. 51, No. 3 (Aug., 1971), p 485.

to embody many of the qualities of the ideal settler of the Araucanía: industrious, hardworking, and foreign. [8] The region was administered by Chilean military officers, these often lived in areas close to indigenous populations in order to protect Valdivia and keep any potential violence at bay.

While the colonies of Valdivia were being developed in the 1840's with the promise of economic growth, military settlements, and mentalities about colonization more generally, were also evolving and reflected a politics of expansion. This change was clearly reflected by the Chilean president Manuel Bulnes' authorization of the construction of a military fort in the Magellan region 1843, and the simultaneous founding of the city of Punta Arenas. These small settlements and isolated colonies were the result of a growing discussion among the nation's capitalist bourgeoisie class and the press about how the young republic wanted to see itself in relation to the developing nations of South America and Europe. They cam to believe that the settlement of the territory of Chile was an incomplete process, and as such the full potential of the republic, agriculturally as well as industrially, had not yet been tapped. The economic crisis of 1857 only contributed to calls for further expansion south, and by 1862 the city of Angol, which would later become a major colony for European settlers, was founded in Mapuche territory.[9] The occupation of this territory came to symbolize another form of land enclosure for the Mapuche. While in the mid 19th century the Mapuche were able migrate south in order to escape the

[8] While the Chilean government came to view these settlers as the example for Chilean colonos to follow, there was much debate within these colonies as to whether they identified with any form of Chilean national identity. George F. Young, *The Germans in Chile: Immigration and Colonization, 1849- 1914* (New York: Center for Migration Studies New York, 1974) 49.

[9] **Leonardo Leon,** ***Araucanía: La Violencia Mestiza y el Mito de la Pacificación, 1880-1900,*** (Santiago, Editorial ARCIS, 2005) 106. (Araucanía*: Mestizo Violence and the Myth of Pacification, 1880-1900*)

encroaching colonization policies of the Chilean government, the colonization of areas of the Araucanía meant that the Mapuche were trapped in the north by the state and in the south by growing colony of Valdivia. These settlements were a sign of a hardening border that foreshadowed the resettlement of territory after the Wars of Occupation in the 1880s.

Embedded within the discussions of economic progress and the territorial growth of the Chilean nation was the equally significant question of where indigenous peoples fit into this larger vision, if at all. As the Araucanía was portrayed in media sources as a lush, fertile land, indigenous peoples living in the region were portrayed as its inefficient stewards, too lazy and civilized to fully cultivate its potential. Throughout the colonial period, and up until the mid 19th century, a prevalent image of indigenous peoples originated from 16th century Alfonso de Ercilla poem, "La Araucana," where the Mapuche were depicted as noble warriors, and thus worthy opponents of the Spanish Conquistadors. Despite this portrayal, throughout the colonial period the Mapuche were always seen as inferior to the Spanish, and descriptions of their "savage" and "barbarous" behavior can be traced back to the 16th century As the Chilean state began making inroads south, these stereotypes made a resurgence, and media sources such as the popular Chilean newspaper "El Mercurio" began portraying the Mapuche as savages, with traits and vices that were antithetical to the civilized, modern image the Chilean state wanted to portray of its citizenry.[10] They were, in essence, a remnant of a distant, unmodern past, and the question emerged of what place, if any, an indigenous person could have in a developing nation. During the 1860's, popular dialogue in the press and eventually congress reflected the idea of two nations residing within Chile. One being the growing, industrial and technologically

[10] Ibid., 105.

advanced nation that wanted to model itself after European societies, and the other was the inferior, non white nation of indigenous peoples, with customs and practices that were incompatible to the goals of the state. These arguments came to a head in 1868, when the politician Benjamin Vicuña argued before congress that the Mapuche were the enemies of civilization because they were emblematic of the treachery and vice that existed in the lowest rungs of society, and instead pursued a vision of cultural homogeneity for the growing state.[11] While the question of where indigenous peoples belonged within growing nations was not unique to Chile, and was in fact one many Latin American writers, politicians and businessmen engaged at this time, it does however reflect the fluidity of Chilean national identity at this time.[12] The ideology behind colonization project in the Araucanía during the 1880's was thus driven by two major motives: the first being a nationalistic mission of bringing these lands into the nation in order to make them economically productive, and the second of bringing "civilization" to the region through the idea of "Chileanization" or the bringing of Chilean values and culture to the region. All of these situations point to a new imaginary that existed among the ministers and central government in Santiago of a "limitless southern frontier," which they could financially exploit and expand from the central regions down to Patagonia.

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[11] Ibid., 110.

[12] As Rebecca Earle argues in her book, *Return of the Native*, countries such as Peru and Mexico moved back and both between policies that that because ruling creole politicians in the 19th century had such an unstable relationship to indigenous peoples, and moved back and forth between policies that sought to assimilate or exclude them, they were ultimately unwilling to reject their own European roots and found indigenous peoples to be incompatible with the modern nations they were trying to form. Rebecca Earle, *Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 1810-1930* (Durham Duke University Press, 2007), 6.

2.The Process of Colonization and its Discontents

The primary apparatus in charge of the colonization of the Araucanía and Southern Chile more broadly was the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Culto y Colonización (1888-1924) (The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization.) Originally founded in 1814 as the country was engaged in a war of Independence from the Spanish, the primary role of the Ministry of Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) was to serve as a diplomatic intermediary between the central government of Santiago and other countries through its embassies around the world. In 1871, the word "colonizacion" (colonization) is added to its name, signifying an increasing priority from the government to colonize the south with foreigners. The colonization part of the ministry's name was dropped in 1924, by that time settlement projects in the Araucanía and extending to the Strait of Magellan were completed. In the role as coordinators of the colonization project, representatives of the Ministry of Colonization in southern Chile worked in tandem with local bureaucrats (or *intendentes*) who had existed in some form since the colonial period. These local *intendentes* would be in close contact with the ministry of colonization as they attended to other needs that arose from the colonization project, such as the creation and expansion of a police force, and matters related to public health.

As local bureaucrats with a unique understanding of the dynamics of the region, *intendentes* formed part of a preexisting government structure that enabled the Ministry of Colonization to begin its project of territorial expansion. While the historical literature of the occupation of the Araucanía reflects the significant role military occupation played in the colonization process of the region, much less has been written about the role of local governance, such as the *intendentes*, in aiding the colonization project. In the late 1870's an

important outpost of what later became the colonization project was headed in Concepcion, a city founded at the mouth of the Bio-Bio river in the 16th century that had an established, stable local government that worked closely with the Ministry of Colonization. From there a number of development projects were administered throughout the region, such as the building of ports in Tome and Lebu, the construction of roads to the *colono* town of Angol, and the numbering of homes in various small towns developing in the interior. All of these developments were meant to both support the growth of the envisioned colonization project in the region, as well as enable the transportation of agricultural products.[13] The expansion of cities and roads played a significant role in the beginning of a larger colonization project because it would later enable engineers to travel to and map increasingly remote areas, and allowed them to create more expansive networks through which they could coordinate mapping expeditions further south. Additionally, cities provided the new *colonos* and European settlers of the Araucanía with resources crucial to survival and more permanent settlement in the region.

The complicated process of mapping the newly occupied territory was primarily assigned to the head engineer of the region, who was appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Relations central office in Santiago. Throughout the 1880's this was Teodoro Schmidt, an engineer of German descent who throughout his tenure was responsible for mapping much of the Araucanía region. As the head of the Topographical Commission, he was accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization, as well as the Ministry of Industry and Public Relations and provided detailed reports of the progress he and his team of engineers were making in both mapping and dividing the land up into parcels for

[13] ANH: Intendencia de Concepcion (Local Governance of Concepcion) vol. 686 (Jul 3,1880) Carta al Ministro del Interior. (Letter to the Minister of the Interior)

auctioning.[14] Land was given monetary value based off soil quality, the nature of the terrain, and its proximity to rivers. Parcels would also gain value as railroads expanded in the region, and cities grew in size. These parcels would then be auctioned off locally, or in Santiago to Chilean settlers who would be considered nationals. As settlers with land titles, they would enjoy a privileged positon in the region in comparison to Chilean settlers who migrated independently, or to indigenous peoples, who were at a significant disadvantage. The majority of the mapped territory, however, would be reserved for European *colonos* who would be courted through the Ministry of Foreign Relations' offices in Berlin and Paris.

As the colonization project increased in scale the challenges of mapping the expansive territory became apparent to Schmidt, and his letters to the Ministry of Colonization reflect many of the issues that would inhibit the success of the colonial project. Firstly, Schmidt advocated for the active recruitment of engineers in academies in Santiago to join his team in the Araucanía, where they could learn to work in the challenging physical terrain.[15] Many of the recruits that came to the region had little experience working in rainy, volatile weather conditions, and this hindered mapping efforts in the winter months. If the central government was serious about parceling the entire Araucanían territory, he argued, it would be wise to create a school of engineering in the region where students could specialize in the geography of the region.[16] Secondly, it would be crucial to provide engineers with the

[14] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 233 (April 11,1889) Reglamento para los injenieros ocupados con la mensura I hijuelacion de los terenos valdios del estado. (Regulations for the Engineers in Charge of Meaursing and Parceling the Empty Territory of the State)

[15] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 233 (October 19,1889) Carta a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y de Colonizacion (Letter to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization)

[16] Ibid.

financial support they needed to have the tools necessary to perform their duties adequately. Lastly, it would be necessary for the government to give engineers enough financial support to incentivize working in the Araucanía and staying there. The poor weather conditions, lack of financial support, and poor infrastructure had led to an exodus of engineers, and time was wasted in the constant training new recruits. In an 1889 letter to both the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Colonization, Schmidt accused both of these offices of advancing their colonization projects on the backs of those who suffered and worked in good faith. Engineers, he proposed, didn't just parcel out lands for auctioning, but also sought to provide a stable culture in the region despite the lack of support from the central government.[17] In order to make his case, Schmidt provided the names of all the engineers that had once worked and subsequently left the Araucanía from the years 1880 to 1886 along with their titles and the number of hectares that each engineer had measured for the ministries.[18] With such a high turnover rate, he concluded, it would not be possible for the entire region to be parceled efficiently.

From its offices primarily in Berlin and Paris, the Ministry of Foreign Relations courted potential European settlers, with an emphasis on those with a knowledge of agriculture and industry. These settlers could bring their families with them and, depending on the financial status of the ministry, have their voyage from Europe paid for by the ministry, as well as steamship tickets from the port of Talcahuano in the Araucanía to their final destination in the region. Once there, they would receive a provisionary land title, which would allow them to claim temporary ownership of the land. Before making travel arrangements,

[17] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 233 (March 2, 1889) Carta a Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y de Colonizacion (Letter to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization)
[18] Ibid.

potential settlers would need to meet certain stipulations. Firstly, male *colonos* would ideally be married and travel with their families. Male heads of family, depending on the availability and shifting laws, would typically be entitled to eleven hectares of land. Each son over the age of eleven would entitle them to an additional nine hectares. The ideal candidate should have a background in agriculture, or a profession that would play some role in the colonization industry, such as a welder, a cobbler, or a railway background.[19] Potential candidates should be free of communicable diseases, be literate, and free of a criminal background. New settlers, according to the contract, were to personally live in the territory for no less than five years with their families and could not be absent from their parcel for more than four months of the year without permission of the director of colonization. Within three to five years, the new settlers should fence their territory and spend no less than 500 pesos to erect buildings on their land.[20] Once these terms were accepted, the Chilean government would pay for the colonist's steamship tickets, provide them with a sum of money, and install them in these newly redrawn fiscal territories. One of the most important conditions for a permanent land title was that the *colono* successfully grow crops on their plot, and by doing so contribute to the growth of the local economy of the region. As the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Berlin and Paris worked to recruit more settlers, The Ministry of Colonization in Chile would be in charge of keeping track of where settlers would be living, as well as ensuring that the met the requirements for both

[19] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol 439 (August 1883) "Notizen über Chile und dessen Colonisationsverhaltnisse druck von C.L Pfeil" (Notes about Chile and its Colonization Conditions by C.L Pfeil)

[20] Jose Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche Siglo XIX y XX*. (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2000), 344.

the provisional and permanent land titles. While settlers underwent a screening process in the offices of Berlin and Paris prior to their arrival, it was not uncommon to encounter cases where these *colonos* did not meet certain criteria, especially around the additional hectares given for children. Settlers in some cases provided false documents or had false witnesses to vouch for the ages of their sons, and officials from the Ministry of Colonization would travel to their neighborhoods to investigate the validity of their claims.[21] The potential for fraudulent claims by *colonos* added an additional challenge to a Ministry that by 1889 was struggling to accommodate the growing needs of the settler communities.

The Ministry of Colonization also faced mounting pressure as newly arrived settlers found that the region lacked the infrastructure to support the numbers of people who were arriving every month as well as parcels for settlement. *Colonos* who arrived years earlier hastily built hotels, shops, and entertainment venues built in order to support the colonization project and meet the needs of the new arrivals. The open lands needed for these projects were given to local settlers who had arrived years prior and had been able to accumulate some wealth.[22] While it was not uncommon for the Ministry of Colonization to give lands to wealthy settlers with an eye for new business, these practices created the additional problem of reducing the amount of land available for new *colonos* and for sale to potential settlers in Chile. This added more pressure for engineers to accelerate their mapping efforts and move further south into the Magellan region throughout the 1890s. As

[21] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Vol. 984 (March 3, 1892) "Carta de Horacio Echegri a Sebastian Lachsinger" (Letter from Horacio Echegri to Sebastian Lachsinger)

[22] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Vol. 426 (December 3, 1889) "Carta de Arturo Bernard al Ministro de Colonizacion" (Letter from Arturo Bernard to the Minister of Colonization)

lands continued to be divided, however, there was less and less mapped territory to give to the *colonos* who were arriving in the region, and with the arrival of new people came also the arrival of new diseases. Throughout the first two decades of the colonization project, there were several outbreaks of smallpox in the region, which alarmed both health officials and the Ministry of Colonization. Hospitals in the region were notoriously underfunded, and local *intendentes* frequently wrote to the central government in Santiago petitioning for vaccines and funding to hire more doctors. As the Chilean press began reporting of diseased ships arriving to the shores of other countries who were also actively engaging in the recruitment of Europeans such as Argentina and Uruguay, this only added to existing fears that both the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization had been careless in their recruitment of settlers, and were not doing enough to protect the welfare of Chilean citizens. These sporadic outbreaks, along with press reports, made it easy to correlate the new settlements with these diseases. The skepticism expressed by these press sources only added to the pressure already facing the Ministry of Colonization, which was increasingly unable to balance its responsibilities in the Araucanía.

The communications between European settlers and the Ministry of Colonization reveal that foreign *colonos*, especially during times of financial precarity, frequently wrote to the ministry petitioning for monetary support, though these claims often fell on deaf ears. As the colonization project grew and the already large bureaucracy struggled to address the challenges of mapping, distributing, and settling the territory, many of these concerns went unaddressed, and *colonos* reached out to other authority figures seeking support. Individuals often wrote to religious figures and embassy officials from their countries of origin, asking them to write to the Minister of Colonization on their behalf. Their pleas reveal the financial precarity of the colonial project, as many of these *colonos* were often

one failed crop cycle away from starvation.[23] It also reveals the lack of structure locally to deal with the needs of these new communities, while some communities wrote in desperate need of food and supplies, many of the petitions that overwhelmed the ministry were smaller matters, such as requests for additional livestock or land. This meant that the petitions of communities in very precarious conditions often went unattended by the already overwhelmed ministry. In some cases, *colonos* of the same nationality made their petitions as a community in hopes of getting the attention of the minister of colonization. In 1889 a British archbishop wrote to the minister of colonization to inform him about the conditions of British *colonos* who have recently immigrated to the region. While he reassures the minister of colonization Martin Drouilly that they are not in any immediate danger, he nevertheless expressed concern that these settlers had arrived after crop season, and were unlikely to have enough food to tide them through the winter season. Moreover, *colonos* often claimed that government subsidy they received on arrival was cut off quickly, and the animals the settlers were loaned for a sum were weak and unable to perform the necessary farm duties.[24] Martin Drouilly's response was tepid and skeptical, and argued that the Britisb *colonos* were in fact doing well, and had sufficient funds to live comfortably through the winter months. [25] Drouilly's response is indicative of a ministry that by this time was becoming increasingly overwhelmed by the colonization project, and was both unwilling and unable to address the challenges of integrating settlers into the region. Firstly, 1889 was a year in which colonization in the Araucanía reached a peak, prices went

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[23] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Vol. 442, (September 1889)
"Reporte Annual de Martin Drouilly al Ministo de Relaciones Exteriores" (Annual report to the minister of Foreign Relations from Martin Drouilly)
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

up for *hijuelas* (land plots) because there was less land in the region available in the region to be distributed. As such, a priority for the ministry was not so much the well being of the settlers who had already arrived, but more the ways in which expansion southward could be accelerated to keep accommodating the waves of *colonos* arriving from Europe. Secondly, his response is revealing because it was one that took place privately, between the bishop who was advocating for his compatriots, and himself. Combing through the ministry of foreign relations volumes during the first decade of this colonial project, it becomes evident that cases of *colonos* complaining of a lack of funding, supplies and basic tools of survival were commonplace, and follow up letters indicate that many of these complaints did not receive responses from the ministry, or if they did, were often dismissive. These cases, however, were private, and it was only until *colonos* began writing home to relatives in Europe revealing the dire conditions in southern Chile that the ministry decided to take action. Their letters reflecting a growing concern that the ministry of colonization was unable, or unwilling to attend to their needs, and served to dampen the image of Chile as a land of opportunity.

In cases where *colonos* made their complaints known to the European presses, the Ministry of Foreign Relations responded swiftly and dismissingly, reflecting a fear of the long term effects these complaints would have on the larger colonization project. As the Ministry of Colonization took on the role of settling in Europeans in their new homes in Chile, the Ministry of Foreign Relations through offices in Paris and Berlin worked extensively to promote colonization through pamphlets and literature.[26] Initially, many of

[26] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 603 (December 6, 1894) "Reporte sobre la colonizacion Europea" (Report on European Colonization)

these works were meant to introduce European audience to Chile, and portrayed the country as an idyllic, pastoral land with limitless potential for both foreign investors as well as any potential agricultural settlers. The ministry often invested in authors who could write pamphlets, articles, or books that would describe the geography, agriculture, and natural resources of the central valley and southern regions of the country. [27] Excerpts of these works appeared in local newspapers, which often served as recruitment tools for colonization. The European press, however, also became a means through which *colonos* could present their grievances about the way in which both ministries were coordinating the settlement process. In June 1889, the European press reported on abuses against immigrants on the steamship Imperial, where immigrants claimed that they were made to pay for their passages despite the Chilean governments promises that they would cover transportation costs. [28] Letters from bureaucrats working for the Ministry of Foreign Relations denied what they referred to as overblown claims, though they also expressed concern about how these reports might affect the reputation of the colonization program. In the coming months, more reports would appear in the newspapers about missing luggage on voyages and robberies aboard the steamships, all of which added to the growing concern of the ministry. In August of the same year the ministry responded to more complaints from *colonos* who had arrived to Chile, and claimed that the government had done little to help them settle and find employment, putting families in financial jeopardy. As the minister of

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While other offices existed in Seville and later Rome, the most important offices throughout the process of colonization were those of Berlin and Paris, which also reflected the ministry's preference for French and German settlers.

[27] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 550 (October 24, 1893) "Reporte del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores en Berlin" (Report from the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Berlin)

[28] Ibid.

the Paris office argued, people often lied throughout the vetting process, making it difficult to discern what the skill sets each settler had. These settlers, he argued, were also aware of the Chilean governments particular interests in *colonos* with a background in industry or agriculture.[29] As such, neither ministry was responsible if these settlers were unable to find jobs upon arrival. Furthermore, as colonization progressed crime became a growing issue, and the assassination of *colonos* and banditry affected colonization efforts, as countries such as Italy and later Switzerland began banning immigration to Chile expressing concern for the welfare of their citizens. Italy in particular cited information gathered from letters written by *colonos* as one of the main reasons why they restricted immigration to the country in 1890.[30] The growing political instability in Chile, and the civil war of 1891, only reinforced the claims in newspapers that the country was too unstable and unorganized to support colonization on a large scale. For the Ministry of Foreign Relations, which was responsible for meeting immigration quotas set by the central government every year, a ban on immigration from several European countries could potentially have a paralyzing effect, though they tried to offset these setbacks by focusing their efforts on recruiting French farmers, a task that was made easier with the formation of a second colonization office in France.[31] The challenges the offices of colonization worsened as the distribution of territory

[29] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Vol. 440. (August 9, 1889) "Carta al Ministerio de Colonizacion" "Letter to the Minister of Colonizaction"

[30] Immigration efforts to Chile were also adversely affected by reports of banditry in the region. Newly arrived European *colonos* were particular vulnerable, since bandits were aware that they had traveled with their belongings and a sum of cash. More on violence in the region and its effects on state formation in the region in chapter 3. ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) Vol. 440 (August 21, 1890) "Carta al Ministerio de Colonizacion" "Letter to the Minister of Colonizaction"

[31] The central government frequently set immigration quotas that were not in line with the capacity of the ministry. Instead these quotas were frequently influenced by the immigration policies of Chile's neighbors, mainly Argentina. As Argentina populated much of its southern region with European settlers (primarily from Italy), the Chilean government became increasingly concerned

in the Araucanía became more complicated. As land was distributed to both Chileans and Europeans by the ministry, local Chilean and indigenous peoples were subject to the laws of the Chilean state and were asked to produce proof of land ownership. This opened the door both to illegal land grabs and to a market for those looking for fraudulent land titles. As a result, the late 1890's and early 1900's were a period of turmoil in the region as these three groups (Europeans, Chileans, and indigenous communities) sought to negotiate their place within Chilean society and for literal control of the territory.

3. Indigenous Responses to Colonization

Throughout the colonization project, the question of whether or not Chilean *colonos* and European settlers could be expected to live alongside indigenous peoples was frequently debated among government officials in the Araucanía and Santiago as well as in the press. Those who advocated for a complete expulsion of the Mapuche from the Araucanía argued that they could not be expected to assimilate into a civilized society, and were incapable of understanding or feeling any sense of *patria,* or national pride, for their new country.[32] The liberal humanist view of the conflict between the Mapuches and *colonos* called for an integration process that meant unconditionally accepting the new land distribution processes of the Chilean government. Those that argued for a more humane treatment of the Mapuche, such as the politician Benicio Alamos Gonzalez, believed that

about Argentina using this influx of immigrants as an excuse to populate the Patagonia region, which up until 1898 had a fluid border line. For more on migration to Argentina, see: Jose Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*: *Spanish immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. And Samuel Baily, *Immigrants in the Lands of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870–1914.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.

[32] Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche Siglo XIX y XX*, (*History of the Mapuche People, 19th and 20th Centuries)* 353.

the Mapuche needed to accept notions of civilization and modernity in order to be able to keep some of their territory and enjoy the privileges of being a new Chilean citizen. The best indigenous person, he argued, was one that "arrived to civilization without losing their primitive values, nor the noble impulses that would allow them to love their new patria, or nation." [33] Accepting civilization, as defined by Gonzales and other advocates for fairer treatment of the Mapuche meant accepting a loss of territory and much of their traditions, these sacrifices were necessary if indigenous groups ever wanted to form part of a society that could consider them citizens. In other words, the coexistence of an autonomous indigenous territory with its own identity alongside a growing state (with growing nationalist and capitalistic views) would not be compatible. What sources from the offices of Ministry of Foreign Relations and Colonization reveal is that the Mapuche were never treated as equals to the *colonos* and *nacionales,* and this included Mapuche individuals that went through the Chilean government to obtain legal rights to their lands. Local chiefs, in an effort to negotiate the extent and nature of government expansion, travelled to Santiago and met with President Santa Maria and later President Balmadeca.[34]After being reassured that indigenous lands would be protected by the government these chiefs went home to find that their requests were not honored, and the parceling and fencing of territory in the region continued. In many cases, their lands were deemed too economically valuable by surveying engineers to allow them to stay, or were instead reserved for the building of cities or roads.

[33] Ibid., 340.

[34] Julio Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche: de la inclusión a la Exclusion*. (Santiago: Direccion de Bibliotecas, Archivos, y Museos, 2003). 27. (*The Formation of the State, Nation, and the Mapuche Peoples: From Inclusion to Exclusion.)*

Mapuche communities often found themselves disproportionally affected by colonization efforts, and their ancestral homes were frequently at the mercy of a bureaucratic and legal system that was unwilling to acknowledge their ancestral claims to land. As the Ministry of Colonization distributed land titles, officials sought to restrict the concentration of large amounts of territory to any one individual. While the Ministry of Colonization used the rigid social hierarchies that were created in Central Chile as a result of the development of large estates in order enact policies that entitled settlers to small plots, however these laws greatly affected Mapuche communities that lived communally on large plots of land. Mapuche community leaders found their political power neutralized as their territory was reduced significantly, and the government came to increasingly disapprove of Mapuche families living in large groups. Large landholdings with a sizeable population, for an already large but thinly spread local government, were portrayed by the central government of Santiago as both a financial and security threat, particularly in the first years after the end of the war and in remote areas of the southern Araucanía.[35] The ability to move between large territories, in addition, was a significant part of Mapuche culture, since much of their economy revolved around cattle raising and many communities lived semi nomadic lifestyles until the Wars of Occupation. For groups that depended significantly on cattle for their income, the restriction of free movement as a result of the colonization project hindered their ability to move their animals and produce a profit.[36] Those that lived in more permanent settlements saw a reduction of their lands, which led to

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[35] Pinto, *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo mapuche: de la inclusión a la Exclusion*. 25. (*The Formation of the State, Nation, and the Mapuche Peoples: From Inclusion to Exclusion.)*

[36] Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche Siglo XIX y XX*, (*History of the Mapuche People, 19th and 20th Centuries)* 18.

a scarcity of food, and forced many communities to separate and resume semi nomadic lifestyles in search of work and food sources. While *colonos* enjoyed a better treatment by the central government as opposed to the Mapuche, their inability to accumulate land, as well as the relatively fluid means through which people purchased land through auctions in Santiago and later Southern Chile meant that land grabs and the overselling of land was commonplace.[37] This placed them in a vulnerable position, as the territories they owned and worked in could be taken by other *colonos* who displaced them for their lands. This, however, was not a problem the European settlers faced, as they had regions of land within the Araucanía that were reserved exclusively for these immigrant populations and their documentation was a priority of the Ministry of Colonization.

Mapuche landholdings in the Araucanía were frequently in conflict with plans to expand the railroad in the region, which by this period had become a symbol of civilization and economic progress not only in Chile but throughout much of Latin America. In cases where railroad lines were planned on what was historically Mapuche territory, some communities sent representatives to the capital in order to divert construction from the area. When the viaduct of the Rio Malleco was inaugurated, for example, 50 indigenous leaders went before President Balmaceda in Santiago to ensure that the government would not encroach on their territories.[38] The promises made to these indigenous leaders, however, were not honored, and their lands were divided. The consequences of Chilean colonization had a disastrous impact on Mapuche populations that dealt with pestilence, hunger, and the

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[37] Julio Pinto, and Gabriel Salazar. *Historia Contemporanea de Chile II: Actores, identidad, y movimiento*. Santiago: Lom Ediciones, 1999. 151. (*Contemporary History of Chile II: Actors, Identity, and Movement*)

[38] Solberg, Carl E. "A Discriminatory Frontier Land Policy: Chile, 1870-1914" The Americas, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Oct., 1969), p. 117.

loss of their traditions and way of life. As one military official reported in an 1884 memoir of the war, indigenous peoples in the Araucanía had been receiving rations from the local government since 1883 as a result of the extreme poverty they lived in after losing their territory.[39] As many of these communities were pushed to migrate into the cordillera regions of the Araucanía as a result of the war, many were unable to provide sustenance for themselves and either returned to the regions they were from in search of food or migrated to Argentina. As the colonization projects continued, Mapuche peoples were faced the options of leaving the Araucanía, attempting to grow crops in areas with poor soil, or fighting for their lands through petitions and *reclamos,* or lawsuits. Because of their limited knowledge of the Chilean legal system and language barriers, they often found themselves with few options other than migration, and as a last ditch effort some communities chose to send representatives to Santiago in hopes that their petitions might be heard. In order to deal with the growing backlog of complaints, and to curb the arrival of Mapuche leaders seeking an audience with the president, the government of Santiago would assign an office that would mediate conflicts between the indigenous community and others affected by the colonization project.

In order to quell the fears of Mapuche insurrections as a result of the redistribution of territory and tensions with both European and Chilean settlers, the central government in Santiago assigned to cities throughout the Araucanía a *Protector de Indigenas*, or Protector of Indigenous Peoples. This position of a mediator on behalf of indigenous peoples was not unique to Chile, and various countries throughout Latin America used such positions to negotiate both legal and social relationships between the state, citizens, and Indigenous

[39] Ibid.

communities. Within the hierarchy of the ministry of colonization, however, this was one of the most underfunded positions, with protectors often going months without pay. The offices of the protectors were constantly handling backlogged cases, and in some cases the protector in a given community were unfamiliar with the indigenous language spoken in the region. This added an additional challenge to the charge of these bureaucrats, whose correspondence often reflected the frustrations of a bureaucratic system that was unable to address the needs of the people who were arguably most affected by the colonization project. In an 1885 letter to the Minister of Colonization, the protector of Indigenous peoples Ramon Gargueto detailed the difficulties his office had keeping up with the expansive backlog of cases pertaining to indigenous claims to territory. Some of these claims, he wrote, were years old, and more staff was required to deal with these claims in a timely matter that would hopefully result in the courts resolving cases faster.[40] Gargueto's letter, and its frustrated tone throughout, tell the reader a great deal about the relationships local government officials had with both the central government of Santiago and the local Mapuche peoples they interacted with. As he noted, Mapuche peoples had a difficult time explaining themselves and justifying why they were making claims to certain areas.[41] Mapuche peoples, because of their lack of knowledge of the Chilean legal system, were particularly vulnerable to the issues of land usurpation, which frequently reduced their already meager land holdings. Since many had lived in unoccupied territory until 1883, it was unlikely that they would be able to produce documentation that would prove land ownership. The few communities that were able to obtain land titles from the government

[40] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 315 (April 11, 1885) "Carta para el Ministro de Colonizacion." ("Letter to the Minister of Colonization")
[41] Ibid.

faced the additional challenge of ensuring that colonos would not attempt to usurp their lands, and throughout the early 20th century many lawsuits in the Araucania dealt with the issue of fencing in the distributed territories.

The lack of fences in the southern Araucanía area in the years following the occupation were also of particular concern to the central government because it enabled the migration of people and also made it easy for *colonos* to ignore the land borders drawn by the engineers. These actions, in turn, became a way in which *colonos* could challenge state power over the territory and for a time enjoy having larger parcels of land. In reports sent to the Minister of Colonization, local officials in the Araucanía reported *colonos* who appropriated territories in addition to those granted by the government, or of using empty neighboring lands for their crops or to raise their cattle. These lands, in accordance with Chilean law, belonged to the state.[42] Additionally, land in the Southern region was still considered volatile because it was physically far from the cities, and in turn, from the hubs through which the Chilean state was administering and spreading "civilization" through bureaucracy and attempts to expand the local police force. The fear of land appropriation hastened the need to expand roads and railroads further south, and in 1885 Teodoro Schmidt moved his headquarters from Angol to Temuco in order to continue the parceling of lands.[43] With a limited police force and an overworked bureaucratic system, however,

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[42] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 233 (October 4, 1885) Descripcion de terrenos para el remate de diciembre. ("Description of territory for the Auction in December")

[43] Patricio Bernedo Pinto, and Jose Ignacio González Leiva, "Cartografía de la transformación de un territorio: La Araucanía 1852-1887" Revista de Geografía Norte Grande Vol. 54 (2013), p. 186. ("Cartography of the Transformation of a Territory: The Araucanía 1852-1887" Journal of Geography Norte Grande Vol. 54, (2013), p. 186)

local *colonos* in the Southernmost part of the Araucanía were relatively unsupervised, making land grabs and usurpation of territories a growing problem.

As colonization in the Araucanía expanded further south with the creation of roads and the parceling and selling of territories to *colonos*, the disadvantages of a highly centralized government became increasingly apparent to local government officials, engineers, and *colonos* living in the region.[44] While the letters of Teodoro Schmidt and those of European *colonos* themselves often appear without a response from the Minister of Colonization or the Minister of Foreign Relations, these complaints point to a growing dissatisfaction with the colonization project. These cases all point to the underlying fragility of the nation building project in southern Chile, a problem that existed in the region well into the twentieth century. Even local officials and engineers, who often wrote of their faithful work as loyal servants of the Chilean nation, were became increasingly frustrated with a colonization project that was unlike anything that had been done before in Chile.[45] While the central government of Santiago took care to make sure the lines of communication were open through telegraphs and correspondence, the vastness of the Araucanían territory and the lack of manpower make the region physically difficult to control. For the task of maintaining order in the cities and developing towns, the government of Santiago relied heavily on these officials, who often bore the brunt of the consequences of the lack of funding and delayed correspondence. Indigenous communities

[44] As *Intendencia* (local governance) records from this region show, local governments were reliant on Santiago for nearly the entirety of its fiscal matters, this included even the most miniscule of purchases such as chairs for their offices.

[45] ANH: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations) vol. 345 (February 10, 1886) Carta a Ministerio del Interior. (Letter to the Minister of the Interior)

in the decades prior and after the Wars of Pacification contended with a hardening of the border, and were frequently unable to protect their ancestral borderlands from encroachment. While engineers were at the forefront of the mapping of these newly conquered lands, they too dealt with lapses in correspondence and delays in funding that in some cases never arrived. If we read between the lines of petitions from these groups (bureaucrats, indigenous communities, and *colonos*), they all reflect an ambivalence as to whether this nation building project was actually working, or who it was working for. If they were citizens of Chile, these letters often asked, wouldn't their government be doing more to protect them and look after their welfare? By doing so, each of these groups cast into doubt the legitimacy of the state in the region and pointed to flaws in the governing structure of the Araucanía region that would persist until the early twentieth century.